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RECENT CASES
INSURANCE - Joinder of Insurer with Insured - Refusing to
Admit in Evidence Amount of Insurance Policy Which is in Excess
of Amount Required by Statute. - Plaintiff brought this action to
recover $50,000.00 damages for injuries sustained in a collision with
the common carrier truck of defendant. Plaintiff alleged in the
complaint that the amount of the policy of insurance carried by de-
fendant was $50,000.00. The defendant insurance company which
had been joined as a party defendant moved to strike this allegation
from the complaint. The lower court granted this motion by ordering
the plaintiff to amend her complaint to show only that the insurance
complied with the amount as specified by the Public Service Commis-
sion: $5,000.00 for bodily injuries and $1,000.00 for property dam-
ages.1 The plaintiff excepted to this ruling. HELD: On rehearing
Affirmed. The required insurance was the amount admissible in the
pleadings and in evidence, and an excess amount could not be brought
to the attention of the jury. Dobson v. Randolph and American In-
demnity Company- ....... S.C- ., 87 S.E. 2d 869 (1955).
In negligence cases the fact that one of the parties is protected
by liability insurance may not be divulged to the jury since there
is no more effective means of prejudicing the rights of the insured
and insurer. Horsford v. Glass Company, 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533
(1912); Cox v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., Limited,
London, England, 191 S.C. 233, 196 S.E. 549 (1937); Holt v. Oval
Mfg. Co., 177 N.C. 170, 98 S.E. 369 (1919) ; Cosselmon v. Dunfee,
172 N.Y. 507, 65 N.E. 494 (1902). Even in instances where the
jury has been inadvertently informed of the fact that one of the
parties has liability insurance, a charge to the jury to disregard such
testimony is insufficient, and a mistrial is the only effective remedy.
Haynes v. Graham, 192 S.C. 382, 6 S.E. 2d 903 (1939). Necessity
creates an exception to the general rule in that, although the jurors
are not otherwise cognizant of an insurance company's presence in
the suit, during the questioning on their voir dire they may be inter-
rogated relative to their being agents or employees of the insurance
company involved in the specific case. Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C.
129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932). Section 10-702, COD Ov LAWS OV SouTH
CAROLINA, 1952 provides, and the court in construing this statute per-
1. The Public Service Commission increased the limits for bodily injury to
$10,000.00 and for property damages to $5,000.00. Amendment to Section 6,
Rule 57 of the Rules and Regulations of Cone or LAWS o SOUTH CAROLINA,1952. Filed July 23, 1953.
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mits a joinder of the surety with the principal when, as insurance for
performance of a contract or for payment for injuries arising out of
tort, an indemnity bond or insurance is required by law. Where there
is a joinder of insurer with insured under the permissive provision of
the joinder statute, it is impracticable and impossible to prevent
the jury from having knowledge of the fact that an insurance com-
pany is jointly liable with the insured for the damages sustained.
Scott v. Wells, 214 S.C. 511, 53 S.E. 2d 400 (1949). When the
liability insurer of the common carrier may be joined as a party
defendant, but is not joined due to its insolvency, the fact that an
insurance company is not to sustain a share of the losses may not
be revealed to the jury since this disclosure could have no effect
,whatsoever on the liability of the carrier to one injured by its negli-
'gence. McCrae v. McCoy et al., 214 S.C. 343, 52 S.E. 2d 403
(1949). Where there is a joinder and the amount of damages al-
"leged is greater than the amount of the insurance policy, the jury
-must be instructed that the liability of the insurer is limited by the
terms of its policy, whereas the liability of the insured is limited
only by the amount of damages alleged and proved. Daniel, Adnm.
v. Tower Trucking Company, Inc. and American Casualty Co., etc.,
203 S.C. 119, 26 S.E. 2d 406 (1943). In one case, though $5,000.00
-was the extent of liability insurance legally required, the fact that
'defendant common carrier was insured with the defendant casu-
alty companies for a total of $80,000.00 was an allegation to
which the defendants did not object and the court did not comment
on this specific phase of the allegation. Kelly v. Driggers, 214 S.C.
237, 51 S.E. 2d 764 (1949).
A review of the cases wherein one of the parties is protected by
liability insurance reveals that the South Carolina Court has hereto-
fore endeavored to permit recovery commensurate only with the
damages actually sustained by preventing disclosure to the jury of
the insurance company's presence. The court, realizing the inherent
'dangers in such divulgence, has apparently used all tools at its dis-
posal to prevent the existence of insurance from prejudicing the
outcome of the suit. Only in instances of absolute necessity have
the courts yielded to permitting disclosure of insurance. The only
discord in this harmony of law and reason arose in a case in which
there was an allegation of the amount of insurance which was in
excess of the amount required by the Public Service Commission
but in which the justice made no comment on this point of law. Kelly
v. Driggers, supra. In spite of this slight deviation, the principal
case rectified any misunderstanding that might have arisen from the
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Kelly Case, supra, by adhering to the principle that the amount of
damages awarded must be based on actual damages sustained and
proved and not on the amount of insurance carried. If this un-
avoidable disclosure were accompanied by an explanation that the
amount of insurance required by statute is no indication of the
amount of damages that plaintiff has suffered, then the respective
parties in every conceivable instance would be protected in that all
possible prejudices of the jury would be removed.
In the Dobson Case, supra, if the court had allowed the amount
of insurance policy above the minimum to be disclosed, it would
have sanctioned an arbitrary divulgence since no necessity for its
presence was shown. The fact that the statute permits joinder of
insurer with insured would not be a basis for enlarging the rights
of the plaintiff, relative to revealing the amount of insurance to
the jury, beyond those existing prior to the passage of the statute.
Primarily the legal amount is carried because it is mandatory, for
the benefit of the public; all in excess of this amount is principally
for the benefit of the insured; therefore, the fact of the existence of
this excess amount should be kept from the jury just as in the case
of any other non-statutory liability insurance. If the jury is in-
formed of the amount of the policy it is apt to allow a verdict which
is commensurate with the amount of insurance, whether it is greater
or less than the damages alleged, rather than a verdict truly reflect-
ing the actual damages. If the jury is not told what the amount of
the insurance is, and since it is aware of the presence of the insur-
ance company, the risk of prejudicing either the insurer or insured,
depending upon the amount of the insurance policy as compared
to the amount of damages alleged, is apparent. However, if only
the amount of the insurance legally required is revealed, then the
jury is inclined to abandon the dream world of the "limitless funds"
of the insurance company and to be awakened to its responsibility
of granting an equitable recovery.
In a final analysis the Supreme Court has applied to the insurer-
insured joinder cases the well-established rule of law that the jury
may have cognizance of the amount of insurance only where the ne-
cessity for such information exists, thereby sustaining a precedent
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CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS- Joint Will as Evidence of
Contract. - This was a partition proceeding wherein plaintiff claimed
one-half interest in certain property through a quit-claim deed from
his mother. Defendant denied any interest in plaintiff, her brother,
alleging that she was sole owner by virtue of a will jointly executed
by her father and mother whereby they devised all their interest in
said property to plaintiff. The husband died and the wife executed
the aforementioned deed to plaintiff, and subsequently died. The
lower court ruled for the plaintiff. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed.
The mere fact of the execution by husband and wife of a joint will
is not alone sufficient to establish a contractual obligation, and wife
may transfer or devise her interest in property as she wishes after
husband's death. Ellisor v. Watts, 227 S.C. 411, 88 S.E. 2d 351
(1955).
There seems to be some confusion in the cases of the use of the
terms joint, mutual, and reciprocal wills. Consequently, in any analy-
sis of the cases it is necessary to look beyond the terminology applied
by the court and into the substance of the instrument involved. A
summary of the distinctions made by the courts may be found in
the annotation in 169 A.L.R. 9, at page 12. It seems that where
these terms are employed by our Supreme Court they are intended
to be understood as follows: a joint will is a single instrument
signed by more than one party, whereas mutual wills are two or
more instruments executed with a common intention on the part of
the testators. Both joint wills and mutual wills may or may not
represent a contract on the part of the testators. The term "reci-
procal" seems to be used by the South Carolina Court as descrip-
tive of the terms of a will. Thus both joint and mutual wills may
or may not contain reciprocal provisions, but the mere presence of
such provisions does not necessarily import a contract.
The weight of authority is to the effect that the execution con-
currently by two persons of separate wills which are reciprocal in
their provisions, or which are identical in their disposition of proper-
ty to a third party, is not alone and without reference to the terms
contained therein, evidence of a contract between the testators. 57
Am. Jur., Wills, § 729; 169 A.L.R. 68. Such has been the result
in South Carolina where the court has considered this question.
Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79 (1905) ; Dicks v. Cassels,
100 S.C. 341, 84 S.E. 878 (1914). However, some few jurisdic-
tions have held that the mere execution of nearly identical mutual
wills is evidence of a contract, and, coupled with the surrounding
circumstances, may constitute proof of such contract. E. g., Harris v.
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Morgan, 157 Tenn. 140, 7 S.W. 2d 53 (1928); Stevens v. Myres,
91 Ore. 114, 177 Pac. 37 (1918). Also, apparently the majority
of the decisions hold that the mere execution of a joint will is not
sufficient in itself to show a contract between the testators, 169
A.L.R. 68; e. g., Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S.W. 2d 165,
169 A.L.R. 1 (1946); Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108
N.E. 210 (1915), but some of these say that the additional evidence
required to establish the contract is much less in the case of a joint will
than where mutual wills are concerned. Rastetter v. Hoenninger,
supra. There is, however, a respectable minority which holds that the
execution of a joint will raises a presumption of the existence of a
contract; e. g., In re Edward's Estate, 3 Ill. 2d 116, 120 N.E. 2d
10 (1954); Jennings v. McKeen, 65 N.W. 2d 207 (Iowa 1954);
In re Johnson's Estate, 233 Ia. 782, 10 N.W. 2d 664 (1943) ; Fraizer
v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909) ; and this was apparently
the court's view in the oft-cited early English case of Dufour v.
Pareira, 1 Dick. 419, 21 Eng. Reports 332 (1769). In the principal
case Justice Oxner points out that South Carolina has not previous-
ly decided this point, although the case of Buchanan v. Anderson,
70 S.C. 454, 50 S.E. 12 (1905), is cited by some as a holding in
accord with the majority rule.
It is almost universally held that where the terms of a joint will
clearly express the intent of the testators to be obligated by a con-
tract, such contract will be given effect by the court. 57 Am. Jur.,
Wills, § 731; e. g., Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N.E. 307
(1934) ; Beveridge v. Bailey, 53 S.D. 98. 220 N.W. 462, 468 (1928).
This rule is recognized in the principal case. Thus, in the absence
of a clearly stated contractual intention, the problem arises as to
what evidence found within the joint will itself will be priza farie
proof that it was executed pursuant to a contract between the testa-
tors. The use of the word "covenant" in a joint will was given
great weight in finding a contractual relationship in Curry v. Cotton,
supra. And in Rastetter v. Hoenninger, supra, the court, in finding
a contract without the benefit of extrinsic evidence, said that the
repetition of the phrase "'this and this only to be our last mutual
and joint will and testament' . . . strongly tends to indicate" a con-
tractual intention. There seem to be no South Carolina cases in
which the court has found the terms of a joint will or mutual wills
sufficient to constitute a contract without the aid of extrinsic evidence.
For that matter, there seem to be no South Carolina cases where
the court found such a contract, relying to any measure upon the
terms of the wills. However, a contract was found by the lower
1956]
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court in Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S.C. 559, 35 S.T. 757 (1899), a
case involving mutual wills with reciprocal provisions. The Supreme
Court did not discuss any evidentiary matters on review but approved
the lower court's finding of fact and reversed and remanded the
case to give effect to such contract. The relationship between the
testators as disclosed by the joint will has been said by some courts
to furnish evidence of a testamentary contract. E. g., In re Edward's
Estate, supra; Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289, 95 S.W. 347, 359
(1906) ; modified in Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S.W. 1027
(1914). However, in Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79
(1905), a case involving mutual wills, the South Carolina Court
said that the mere fact of blood relationship between the testators
was no ground for the inference that either undertook a legal obliga-
tion. Courts have also found evidence of a contract in a close re-
lationship between the testators and beneficiaries. Tutunjian v. Vet-
zigian, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Schauer v. Schauer, 43
N.M. 209, 89 P. 2d 521 (1939) ; Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643,
96 S.E. 749 (1918). No South Carolina cases directly considering
this question have been found. However, in the principal case there
was a close blood relationship between the testators and the bene-
ficiary, but the court did not mention the possibility of finding there-
in evidence of a contract. Rather, it expressly stated that there was
no evidence of a contractual obligation to be found in the instrument.
Reciprocal provisions in a will jointly executed by husband and
wife have been held to be in themselves evidence that the Will was
executed pursuant to a contract between the testators. Re Adkins,
161 Kan. 239, 167 P. 2d 618 (1946); Underwood v. Myer, 107
W.Va. 57, 146 S.E. 896 (1929). In the principal case the court
recognized these decisions but expressly reserved opinion on the
weight to be given such a factor since in this case no reciprocal pro-
visions were involved.
If the terms of the joint will or the relationship revealed therein
do not constitute in themselves sufficient evidence of a contract, these
elements may be considered with other evidence and in the light
of surrounding circumstances to establish the contract, subject, of
course, to the applicable rules relating to the Statute of Frauds.
57 Am. Jur., Wills, § 733; Clement v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738, 144
S.E. 319 (1928); Williams v. Williams, supra; Wilson v. Gordon,
supra; Turnipseed v. Sirrine, supra. But the South Carolina Court
has repeatedly said that proof of any contract to make a Will must
be clear and convincing, and a higher degree of proof is required
than in other civil cases, because a contract of this nature is not
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favored by the law. Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E. 2d 889
(1945); Dicks v. Cassels, supra; Wilson v. Gordon, supra.
Two other South Carolina cases involving mutual wills have been
found, i. e., Ex parte Hineline, 166 S.C. 352, 164 S.E. 887 (1932) ;
Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus. 116 (S.C. 1785), however, neither dis-
cuss points involved in this casenote.
The principal case seems to settle three issues hitherto undecided
in South Carolina, one expressly and two by implication. First,
the court holds, in accord with the weight of authority, that the mere
execution of a joint will is not sufficient to evidence a contractual
obligation. Secondly, the testators in this case were husband and
wife and the court clearly indicates that the mere fact of close re-
lationship between the testators is no evidence of a contract. Third-
ly, the beneficiary was the daughter of the testators and likewise
the court does not consider this relationship as indicative of a con-
tract. The South Carolina case of Wilson v. Gordon, supra, involv-
ing mutual wills, foreshadowed the decision in the instant case with
reference to the second two issues.
JOHN E. JOHNSTON, JR.
PLEADING- Right of a Defendant in Tort Action to Bring in
Additional Party as Joint Tort-Feasor of Plaintiff in a Counterclaim.
-Plaintiff sued for damages to person and property resulting from
a collision between his automobile and a truck driven by the defen-
dant. The defendant filed a counterclaim against plaintiff and a cor-
poration, alleging that plaintiff was in the employ of the latter and
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the
accident. Upon notice to the plaintiff and the corporation, defendant
moved for an order joining the corporation. From the trial court's
order granting this motion, plaintiff appealed. HELD: Affirmed.
The defendant may interplead the plaintiff's alleged joint tort-feasor
in a counterclaim. The rule that he who asserts a cause of action
arising out of a joint tort may assert it against one or more or all
of the joint tort-feasors applies to a defendant who asserts a cause
of action by counterclaim as well as to the plaintiff himself. Johns
v. Castle- ........- S.C -....... 91 S.E. 2d 721 (1956).
The bringing in of additional parties is largely within the discre-
tion of the trial court. Cleveland v. Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 373, 194
S.E. 128 (1937) ; Murray Drug Co. v. Harris, 77 S.C. 410, 57 S.E.
1109 (1906) ; Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 210 N.W. 822 (1926).
1956]
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".... [W] hen a complete determination of the controversy cannot be
had without the presence of other parties the court must cause them
to be brought in .... ." Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 § 10-
219. There are similar provisions in other jurisdictions: E. g., Cal.
Code of Civil Proc., Deering 1949 § 389; Ill. Revised Statutes, 1951
§ 110-148. The statute should not be construed to allow a joinder
if it has the effect of overriding and revoking well recognized pro-
cedure. Sinonv. Strock, 209 S.C. 134, 39 S.E. 2d 209 (1951). Some
jurisdictions which allow contribution among joint tort-feasors by
statute have allowed the defendant to bring in third persons as par-
ties defendants for the purpose of determining their rights as to con-
tribution. Lottimna v. Cuilla, 288 S.W. 123 (Texas 1926) ; Wait v.
Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 210 N.W. 822 (1926). And the federal rules
of civil procedure permit the bringing in of third parties whenever
their presence is required for the complete determination of a counter-
claim if jurisdiction of them can be obtained and their joinder will
not deprive the court of jurisdiction of the action. Fed..R. Civ.
P. 13(h). However, it is a well established rule of the common
law that the defendant has no right to bring in as parties defendant
joint tort-feasors with him who were not made parties by the plain-
tiff. Larson v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 142 Ohio St. 20, 50 N.E. 2d 162
(1943); Booth v. Manchester R. Co., 73 N.H. 527, 63 AtI. 577
(1906); Doctor v. Robert Lee Inc., 215 S.C. 332, 75 S.E. 2d 68
(1949). The defendant is allowed, in most states, to set forth in
his answer new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim, Code
of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 § 10-652; Cal. Code of Civ. Proc.,
Deering 1949 § 437; and in a tort action the defendant may plead a
similar cause of action against the plaintiff by way of counterclaim
if the cause of action of the plaintiff and defendant arose out of the
same set of facts. Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 § 10-705.
The counterclaim is such that if brought in another action it would
be a separate and independent action, Republic State Bank v. Bailey
Furniture and Lumber Co., 102 S.C. 329, 86 S.E. 680 (1915);
Greenville County v. Greenville, 84 S.C. 410, 66 S.X. 417 (1908);
and a defendant who files a counterclaim is in reality a plaintiff with
respect to the counterclaim. O'neill Bros. v. Crowley, 24 F. Supp.
705 (W.D. S.C. 1938); American Fruit Growers v. Leroche, 39 F.
2d 243 (E.D. S.C. 1928). A plaintiff has the prerogative to sue
any one of the several joint wrongdoers separately or he may proceed
against any number or all of them jointly. Birmingham v. Hawkins,
196 Ala. 127, 72 So. 25 (1916); Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn,
66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429 (1913); Bagwell v. Southern Ry. Co., 21
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F. Supp. 751 (W.D. S.C. 1938) ; Halsey v. Minnesota-South Caro-
lina Land and Timber Co., 174 S.C. 97, 177 S.E. 29 (1934). The
joinder of master and servant in an action by a third person for a
tort of the servant is permitted in most jurisdictions. Moody v.
Hardeman, 44 Ga. App. 676, 162 S.E. 653 (1932); Jenkins v.
Southern Ry. Co., 130 S.C. 180, 125 S.E. 912 (1924). However,
some jurisdictions are contra. Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104
Atl. 815 (1918); French v. Cent. Const. Co., 76 Ohio St. 509, 81
N.E. 751 (1907). The liability of master and servant for a tort
of the latter is joint and several. Southern Ry. Co. v. Davenport,
39 Ga. App. 645, 148 S.E. 171 (1929); Parker v. Bissonette, 203
S.C. 155, 26 S.E. 2d 497 (1943); Newton v. Sozthern Grocery
Stores, 16 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. S.C. 1936). Therefore the defendant
by way of a counterclaim alleging the joint tort of plaintiff and an-
other, not a party to the suit, can cause that party to be brought in
as a party defendant. Griswold v. Morrison, 53 Cal. App. 93, 200
Pac. 62 (1921); Johnson v. Moon, 3 Ill. 2d 561, 121 N.E. 2d 774
(1954); Walker v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 147, 9 N.W. 632; cf. Brown
v. Quinn, 220 S.C. 426, 68 S.E. 2d 326 (1951).
Although the precise question in the instant case had never be-
fore been decided in South Carolina, it is not a startling innovation
of procedure. However, one seeming anomaly which the court did
not discuss is the wording of the counterclaim statute, § 10-703,
which states that the counterclaim must exist in favor of a defendant
and against a plaintiff. The specification of plaintiff and defendant
appears to indicate an intention to restrict a counterclaim to those
who have already been made parties to the action by the complaint.
This problem arose in Johnson v. Moon, supra, in which the court
discussing a similar counterclaim statute said, ". . . we cannot ac-
cept the view that it should be construed as an isolated text ...
the several provisions should be construed together in the light
and general purpose of the act, so as to give effect to the main intent
and purpose of the legislature . . . ." The "several provisions"
referred to are the counterclaim statute and the statute which al-
lows the court to bring in additional parties where a complete de-
termination of the controversy cannot be had without their presence.
In the present case the court reached the same result confronted
with statutes almost identical to the Illinois ones, and it could be
assumed that it gave its statutes a similar liberal construction.
The result reached in the instant case does not establish a third
party practice in South Carolina but it is one more step away from
the rigid common law rules of procedure. Since the state courts
1956]
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are reluctant to change procedural rules in the absence of legislation,
the maximum procedural efficiency will not be reached until the
legislature sees fit to adopt rules similar, if not identical, to the
federal rules of civil procedure.
WiLuAm E. LONG.
REAL PROPERTY - Appointment of Receiver in Partition Ac-
tion. - Action for partition of real estate alleged to be owned by
plaintiffs and certain defendants as tenants in common. The com-
plaint alleged that the remaining defendant, one Galloway, occupied
the house on the above described land and made some claim thereto.
Galloway by answer admitted possession of the premises and denied
the material allegations of the complaint, claiming title under a con-
tract of sale from a real estate agent purportedly representing plain-
tiffs and the other defendants. Thereafter motion was made by the
plaintiffs to require Galloway to deposit with the Clerk of Court a
reasonable sum of money as rental for the premises, past and future,
pending the outcome of litigation. The trial court granted the mo-
tion and ordered Galloway to deposit thirty dollars per month. Gallo-
way appealed to the Supreme Court. HELD: Reversed and re-
manded. The complaint was insufficient to justify appointment of a
receiver in that there was no allegation that the defendant Galloway
was in unlawful possession or insolvent, or committing waste, nor
were any affidavits offered to contradict the affirmative defense. More-
over the action, though nominally for partition, was held in reality
to contest the right of a defendant in possession under a claim of
equitable title. Turner, et al. v. Byers, et al., 226 S. C. 289, 85 S.E.
2d 100 (1954).
It is well recognized that in a suit to partition real property a
court of equity is empowered under certain circumstances to appoint
a receiver. Christ Church v. Fishburne, 83 S.C. 304, 65 S.T. 238
(1938) ; Heinze v. Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co., 126 F. 1 (9th Cir.
1903) (certiorari den., 195 U.S. 631, 25 Sup. Ct. 788, 49 L.Ed. 353) ;
Annot. 127 A.L.R. 1228, 1234 (1940). The most common ground
for the appointment of a receiver in a partition action is the protec-
tion and preservation of the property, or the rents and profits there-
of, from injury, waste, removal, conversion or destruction, although
other circumstances may constitute sufficient grounds for such an
appointment. Sinith v. Smith, 138 N.J. Eq. 463, 48 A. 2d 697
(1941); 68 C.J.S., Partition, § 87 (1950). In New York it has
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been said, "The power of the court in this respect is only limited
by considerations of what is expedient for the interests of the par-
ties concerned." Pignolt v. Bushe, 28 Howard's Practice Reports
9 (N.Y. 1864). Other courts have cautioned, however, that in cases
involving real estate the power to appoint a receiver is a harsh and
dangerous one, and should be exercised with great circumspection.
Kory v. Less, 180 Ark. 342, 22 S.W. 2d 25 (1929) ; Pelzer, Rodgers
& Co. v. Hughes, 27 S.C. 408 (1887). An appointment may be justi-
fied in the protection of the property from waste or loss, Chalta v.
Biller, 212 Cal. 745, 300 Pac. 821 (1931); Christ Church v. Fish-
burne, supra; Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1228, 1235 (1940); or where one
of the parties is in exclusive possession and is insolvent. Hodgin
v. Hodgin, 175 Ind. 157, 93 N.E. 849 (1911); McCrady v. Jones,
McCrady v. Davie, 36 S.C. 136 (1892). A Michigan court has re-
marked that where the other tenants not only deny the complainant's
title but have endeavored to entangle the whole title, and are not
disposed to account for the rents and profits, a receivership is proper.
Duncan v. Campau, 15 Mich. 415 (1867). On the other hand, a
receivership will not be granted in a partition suit where not justi-
fied as a protective measure. Ames v. Ames, 148 Ili. 321, 36 N.E.
110 (1894) ; Tedder v. Tedder, 109 S.C. 451, 96 S.E. 157 (1918) ;
Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1228, 1237 (1940). Thus uncertainty as to the
title of the applicant for a receiver may prevent an appointment.
Patterson v. McCunn, 46 Howard's Practice Reports 182 (N.Y.
1873); Richter v. Lindemann, 166 App. Div. 33, 152 N.Y.S. 784
(1915). Moreover it is stated as a general rule that a receiver will
not be appointed unless the record shows a reasonable probability
that the plaintiff will ultimately be entitled to a decree or judgment.
Williams v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 45 F. 2d 387 (5th Cir. 1930) ;
Bushman v. Bushman, 311 Mo. 551, 279 S.W. 122 (1925); Annot.,
109 A.L.R. 1212 (1937). In Oklahoma it has been held that since
courts of equity are extremely adverse to any interference with the
possession of real estate held under a claim of legal title, the pre-
sumptions are all in favor of the defendant in a hearing for the ap-
pointment of a receiver pendente lite for property so held. Scott v.
Price, 103 Okla. 150, 229 Pac. 618 (1924) ; Wagoner Oil & Gas Co.
v. Marlow, 137 Okla. 116, 278 Pac. 294 (1929). In South Carolina,
the court in Christ Church v. Fishburne, supra, affirmed the appoint-
ment of a receiver in circumstances where claimants were in a
"wrangle over the collection of rents" from tenants in possession. In
so doing the court pointed out, "It is not the case of appointing a
receiver of property which has been in the undisturbed possession
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of one who claims both the legal title and the right to possession.
Such is the case when an action to recover possession of real estate
is brought, or when the proceedings, though nominally for parti-
tion, in fact contests the right and title of one who has heretofore
been in undisturbed possession. Such is not the present case." In
an earlier case action was brought for the recovery of real property.
After the defendant had answered denying plaintiff's title and de-
manding partition of the land, plaintiff moved for appointment of a
receiver. It was held that receivership was not warranted where
the party in possession denied plaintiff's allegation of insolvency and
contested plaintiff's claim of title. The court said, "This certainly
does not make a case warranting the appointment of a receiver, de-
priving the defendant of the possession of the land, and impounding
the rents." DeWalt v. Kinard, 19 S.C. 286 (1882).
There are no previous South Carolina cases squarely in point with
the general factual situation in the instant case. The decision is in
line with the weight of authority, however, in requiring a strong
showing of necessity in order to warrant appointment of a receiver
in a partition suit. The plaintiffs' showing was entirely inadequate
in this respect. The case cannot be regarded as definitive, however,
with respect to the particular consideration of receivership in par-
tition actions. For, as the court points out, as well as being an
action for partition it was also a contest of title and possession. Under
these circumstances the decision is strongly supported by the holding
of the DeWalt case. The court relied on this holding more particu-
larly in regard to the inadequacy of plaintiffs' showing of necessity.
The rationale of the DeWalt case, however, supports just as firmly
the concept that where a contest of title is involved, receivership is
improper. This is also enunciated by way of dicta in the Christ
Church case. Relying on these two cases, the court properly reaf-
firmed the prevailing view, namely, that where one is in possession
under a claim of right a duty arises to proceed with the greatest
caution before depriving him of the benefit of his asserted rights
through receivership.
HtYWAP.D McDoNALD.
OPTIONS -Lessee's Option to Purchase as Affected by An-
other's Offer to Purchase a Larger Parcel Including the Leased
Parcel. - Lessee occupied a lot under lease from the lessor, the lease
containing a first-refusal-to-purchase option: that if lessor received
an offer from a third party for the property and decided to sell, lessee
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would be given the option of buying at the price which lessor had
been offered. Lessor received an offer from a third party for the
demised lot and an adjacent lot, also owned by lessor, for a total
price of $18,000.00. Lessee was notified of this offer and informed
lessor that he was exercising his option to purchase both lots at
the price offered by the third party. Lessor subsequently informed
lessee that he was experiencing difficulty in getting out of his agree-
ment with the third party, and that, in the meantime, he had
received an offer of $12,000.00 for the demised lot itself from an-
other party. Lessee then exercised his option to purchase the de-
mised lot for $12,000.00. Lessor later sold the adjacent lot to the
original third party for $7,500.00. About one and one-half years
later, lessee brought action against lessor alleging that lessor had
refused to comply with contract to sell both lots to lessee for $18,-
000.00 and had falsely represented to lessee that an offer of $12,-
000.00 had been received for the demised lot. Lessee also alleged
that since both lots were approximately of the same value, lessee
was entitled under his option to purchase the demised lot for one-
half the price offered for both lots, which would have been $9,000.00.
The lower court ordered a non-suit, but upon reviewing testimony,
the trial judge concluded that the case should have gone to the jury
and granted lessee's motion for a new trial. Upon lessor's appeal
from the order granting a new trial, HELD: Reversed; non-suit
re-instated and case dismissed. There was no evidence reasonably
warranting an inference of fraud and there could be no recovery
on the theory of a simple breach of contract as lessee's option gave
him a right to purchase the leased lot only. He bad no right to
require the lessor to sell the leased premises for one-half of the
price offered by a third party for both the demised lot and an ad-
jacent lot. Snith v. Traxler, 90 S.E. 2d (S.C. 1955).
Although this question has been before the courts but infrequent-
ly, it has been uniformly held since the first case arose in 1922 that
a lessee with a first-refusal-to-purchase option can obtain an injunc-
tion preventing the lessor from selling a larger parcel of land in-
cluding the leased parcel. New Atlantic Garden v. Atlantic Garden
Realty Corporation, 201 App. Div. 404, 194 N.Y.S. 34 (1922), (af-
firmed without opinion in 237 N.Y. 540, 143 N.E. 734 (1923) );
American Oil Company v. Eastern Market Company, 60 York Leg.
Rec. (Pa.) 33 (1945); Atlantic Refining Company v. Wyoming
National Bank, 356 Pa. 226, 51 A. 2d 719 (1947). However, the
lessee cannot prevent the lessor from selling the larger parcel ex-
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elusive of the leased parcel. Nu-Way Service Station v. Vanden-
berg Brothers Oil Company, 283 Mich. 551, 278 N.W. 683 (1937);
Amcrican Oil Company v. Eastern Market Company, supra; Atlan-
tic Refining Company v. Wyoming National Bank, supra. The
option does not give the lessee the right to purchase the entire
parcel which the lessor desires to sell. Nu-Way Service Station v.
Vandenberg Brothers Oil Company, supra; American Oil Company
v. Eastern Market Company, supra; Atlantic Refining Company v.
Wyoming National Bank, supra. As pointed out by counsel in the
principal case, a contention that the option can be construed as
covering the larger parcel of land violates the Statute of Frauds.
Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, § 11-101(4). Nor can the
lessee be required to meet a third party's offer to purchase the larger
parcel. L. E. Wallack, Inc. v. Toll, 381 Pa. 423, 113 A. 2d 258
(1955). In a case where the lessor was required to convey the larger
parcel to lessee, there was evidence that the lessor's notification to
lessee of an offer by another party for the entire parcel was intended
as a new and independent offer to sell to lessee, was accepted by
lessee as such, and lessor had not accepted offer from third party be-
fore lessee's acceptance. First National Exchange Bank of Roanoke v.
Roanoke Oil Company, 169 Va. 99, 192 S.T. 764 (1937). But in
the absence of such an intention, notification by a lessor to a lessee
of another's offer to purchase a larger parcel does not give the
lessee a right to purchase the leased parcel for a sum proportionate
to the price offered for the whole parcel. New Atlantic Garden v.
Atlantic Garden Realty Corporation, supra; American Oil Company
v. Eastern Market Company, supra. In a case where lessor sold the
entire parcel to a third party without giving lessee notice that he
had received an offer, the court ordered lessor to convey to lessee
the leased parcel for a sum proportionate to that offered by third
party for the entire parcel. Brenner v. Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 27
N.W. 2d 320 (1947).
The rule, as followed by the principal case, that a first refusal-to-
purchase option gives the lessee no right to purchase the leased parcel
for a sum proportionate to the price offered by another party for
the entire parcel, appears to be the better one. Although this rule
may sometimes result in an impasse in cases where the lessor desires
to sell only the entire parcel and lessee desires to purchase only the
leased parcel, there appears to be no other equitable solution. In
such cases as the Brenner Case, supra, it would appear that the best
solution would be to set aside the conveyance to the third party and
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allow lessor and lessee to effect some mutually acceptable compro-
mise. Otherwise, a hardship may be imposed on the third party who
could find himself in possession of only a portion of the whole parcel
when he may have wanted the whole parcel or none at all. If the
lessor and lessee cannot effect a compromise, both are still protected
in their rights under the option agreement. In any event, as was
pointed out by the court in the principal case, it is not for the courts
to undertake to apportion the fair value of the leased parcel in pro-
portion to the price offered for the whole parcel.
CIIARU.S W. MARCABANKS.
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